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119049
11 Pokrovskiy boulevard, room S629
Phone:
+7 (495) 772-95-90*27447, *27947, *27190
+7 (495) 916-88-08 (Master’s Programme Corporate Finance)
- Email: df@hse.ru
Head of Corporate Finance Research Center, Dr., tenured professor
The HSE School of Finance is the leading Russian competence center in the field of corporate finance, business valuation, banking, stock market, risk management and insurance, accounting and audit.
HSE is the first Russian university in the global ranking "QS - World University Rankings by subject", 2022 in the subject area of Accounting and Finance. Moreover, the university is the 1-st in the rating "THE World University Rankings by subject" in the subject area of Business & Management Studies, 2022
Grishunin S., Ivashkovskaya I., Brendeleva N. et al.
Journal of Corporate Finance Research. 2025. Vol. 19. No. 1. P. 25-40.
Badr I., Rawnaa Ibrahim, Hussainey K.
In bk.: Opportunities and Risks in AI for Business Development. Vol. 2: 546. Bk. Opportunities and Risks in AI for Business Development. Prt. 636. Springer, 2025. P. 385-399.
Financial Economics. WP HSE. HSE University, 2025. No. 1/FE/2025.
The paper by Anilov A. and Ivashkovskaya I. "What Incentives do Boards Provide with Inside Debt? The Evidence from Payout Policies" has been accepted for presentation at the EURAM 2021 Online Conference
The paper by Anilov A. and Ivashkovskaya I. has been accepted for presentation at the EURAM 2021 Online Conference to be held 16-18 June 2021.
For more information about the conference, follow the link.
Article title:
"What Incentives do Boards Provide with Inside Debt? The Evidence from Payout Policies"
Annotation:
The paper investigates whether and how the boards can apply inside debt compensation to CEOs to influence payout decisions. The paper contributes to the literature, first, by showing that more inside debt holdings of a CEO increase both the probability and the level of share repurchases. Moreover, inside debt incentivizes a CEO to choose repurchases as a main channel of payout policies. The results demonstrate that inside debt aligns CEO interests not only to those of debtholders, but also to those of shareholders, and therefore inside debt should become effective tool of monitoring CEOs by the boards of directors. However, different components of inside debt (deferred compensation and pension benefits) affect payout decisions differently. The results show that deferred compensation as a shorter-term type of compensation provides incentives for repurchases, while longer-term compensation in the form of pension benefits provides incentives for cash dividends. Therefore, inside debt provides additional flexibility to the boards in monitoring and influencing CEO decisions and performance.