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Regular version of the site
Contacts

119049 Moscow, Russia
11 Pokrovskiy boulevard, room S629

Phone:

+7 (495) 772-95-90*27447, *27947, *27190
+7 (495) 916-88-08 (Master’s Programme Corporate Finance)

- Email: df@hse.ru

finance@hse.ru 

Administration
Head of the School Irina Ivashkovskaya

Head of Corporate Finance Research Center, Dr., tenured professor

Manager Uliana Nepryakhina

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27190)

Senior Administrator Olesya Galyanina

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27447)

Administrator Tatyana Lipatova

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27947)

Administrator Irina Skobeleva

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27946)

Article
Resilience Index Development for Digital Ecosystems and Its Implementation: The Case of Russian Companies

Grishunin S., Ivashkovskaya I., Brendeleva N. et al.

Journal of Corporate Finance Research. 2025. Vol. 19. No. 1. P. 25-40.

Book chapter
Beyond Claims: CSR Reports, ESG Initiatives, and the Consequences of Impressions Management; Empirical Analysis

Badr I., Rawnaa Ibrahim, Hussainey K.

In bk.: Opportunities and Risks in AI for Business Development. Vol. 2: Opportunities and Risks in AI for Business Development. Prt. 636. Springer, 2025. P. 385-399.

Working paper
A New Approach to Identifying Political Connections: Evidence from the Russian Banking Sector

Kozlov N., Semenova M.

Financial Economics. WP HSE. HSE University, 2025. No. 1/FE/2025.

Research Seminar "Empirical Research in Corporate Finance"

Event ended

We invite you to take part in the research seminar "Empirical Research of Corporate Finance", which will be held remotely via ZOOM on June 29 at 16.00 (link to connect)

During the seminar 2 reports will be discussed:

- Polina Khmeleva, intern of corporate finance laboratory, the report: "Does Corporate Governance matter for Strategic Firm Performance? Evidence from Emerging and Developed European Markets".

Abstract:

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of corporate governance as a part of corporate financial architecture on the strategic performance of large nonfinancial companies operating in developed and emerging European capital markets. To avoid biased estimations and create a model with high forecasting power, we apply the original concept of corporate financial architecture and develop integrated approach for corporate performance modeling. We introduce intrinsic value - based and expectations - based measures to be focused on strategic performance of the firms. We paid specific attention to the analysis of endogeneity of company’s ownership structure in European markets in 2000s. On the sample of 157 largest public companies of Eastern and Western Europe we demonstrated that corporate governance plays an important role as a component of corporate financial architecture.

- Anastasia Subbotkina, intern of corporate finance laboratory, the report: "The impact of family ownership on the efficiency of Russian companies."

Abstract:

The study examines the impact of family involvement on the performance of Russian public companies over the period from 2011 to 2018. About 40% of the companies in the sample are family-owned. A regression model with fixed effects of the year and industry assesses the impact of family controls on market and accounting performance (Tobin's ratio and return on assets). Previously published work reflects the controversial impact of family involvement. There is also a shortage of such empirical work in Russia due to the complexity of collecting data on family participation. The analysis revealed that family control increases the efficiency of companies, especially young ones. The results are fairly consistent regardless of the chosen definition of a family company. In addition, the family CEO significantly improves the financial results of the company, while the transfer of control into the hands of the heirs or the family CEO has a positive effect only on the return on assets. So, Russian companies are encouraged to maintain family involvement, especially active management in the role of CEO.

Conference ID: 937 8803 4144
Password: 389278