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Regular version of the site
ФКН
Contacts

119049 Moscow, Russia
11 Pokrovskiy boulevard, room S629

Phone:

+7 (495) 772-95-90*27447, *27947, *27190
+7 (495) 916-88-08 (Master’s Programme Corporate Finance)

- Email: df@hse.ru

finance@hse.ru 

Administration
Head of the School Irina Ivashkovskaya

Head of Corporate Finance Research Center, Dr., tenured professor

Manager Uliana Nepryakhina

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27190)

Senior Administrator Olesya Galyanina

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27447)

Administrator Tatyana Lipatova

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27947)

Administrator Irina Skobeleva

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27946)

Book
Systemic Financial Risk: An Emerging Market Perspective

Edited by: A. M. Karminsky, Mikhail Stolbov.

Palgrave Macmillan, 2024.

Book chapter
Beyond Claims: CSR Reports, ESG Initiatives, and the Consequences of Impressions Management; Empirical Analysis

Badr I., Rawnaa Ibrahim, Hussainey K.

In bk.: Opportunities and Risks in AI for Business Development. Vol. 2: 546. Bk. Opportunities and Risks in AI for Business Development. Prt. 636. Springer, 2025. P. 385-399.

Working paper
Momentum Factor or Factor Momentum in REITs Market?

Dobrynskaya V. V., Tomtosov A., Речмедина С.

SERIES: FINANCIAL ECONOMICS. WP BRP 60/FE/2017. НИУ ВШЭ, 2025

The article by Irina Ivashkovskaya and Artem Anilov has been published in the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance

The article by Irina Ivashkovskaya and Artem Anilov titled «CEO overconfidence and payout policy: The moderating power of governance mechanisms» has been published in the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance.

The paper examines the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and corporate payout decisions. Building on agency theory and upper echelons theory, the authors show that both external governance enhancements driven by the implementation of Dodd-Frank Act provisions, and internal governance mechanisms, including gender diversity and board independence mitigate the adverse effects of CEO overconfidence on cash dividends, while the moderating effects on share repurchases are less significant. For example, DF provisions attenuate the negative effect of overconfidence on dividend payouts by approximately one-third. Moreover, the results suggest that in innovative firms, governance mechanisms appear less effective in moderating overconfidence, suggesting that shareholders may tolerate or even encourage overconfident behavior to support risk-intensive innovation strategies.


The article can be accessed through the link.