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Regular version of the site
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Contacts

School of Finance              Faculty of Economic Sciences   HSE University 

119049 Moscow, Russia
11 Pokrovsky Bulvar, S629

School of Finance: df@hse.ru      +7 (495) 772-95-90 *27447, *27190, *27947

Master’s Programmes:  Corporate Finance,           Master of Business Analytics

 

Head of the School of Finance Irina Ivashkovskaya

Doctor of Sciences in Finance, Tenured Professor, Head of the Corporate Finance Center

Manager Uliana Nepryakhina

+7 495-772-95-90 *27190

Senior Administrator Olesya Galyanina

+7 495-772-95-90 *27447

Administrator Tatyana Lipatova

+7 495-772-95-90 *27947

Book
Systemic Financial Risk: An Emerging Market Perspective

Edited by: A. M. Karminsky, Mikhail Stolbov.

Palgrave Macmillan, 2024.

Article
What Drives Green Bonds Returns and Valuation of the Safe-Assets Effecton Global, Russian and Chinese Markets?

Svetlana Grigorieva, Narmin Isaeva, Aliya Azizova et al.

Journal of Corporate Finance Research. 2026. Vol. 20. No. 1. P. 75-85.

Book chapter
The Impact of Sanctions on the Financial Performance and Creditworthiness of Russian Non-Financial Companies

Dobrynina Polina, Grishunin S.

In bk.: The 12th International Conference on Information Technology and Quantitative Management (ITQM 2025). Netherlands: ScienceDirect, 2025. P. 166-174.

Working paper
Momentum Factor or Factor Momentum in REITs Market?

Dobrynskaya V. V., Tomtosov A., Речмедина С.

SERIES: FINANCIAL ECONOMICS. WP BRP 60/FE/2017. НИУ ВШЭ, 2025

The article by Irina Ivashkovskaya and Artem Anilov has been published in the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance

The article by Irina Ivashkovskaya and Artem Anilov titled «CEO overconfidence and payout policy: The moderating power of governance mechanisms» has been published in the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance.

The paper examines the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and corporate payout decisions. Building on agency theory and upper echelons theory, the authors show that both external governance enhancements driven by the implementation of Dodd-Frank Act provisions, and internal governance mechanisms, including gender diversity and board independence mitigate the adverse effects of CEO overconfidence on cash dividends, while the moderating effects on share repurchases are less significant. For example, DF provisions attenuate the negative effect of overconfidence on dividend payouts by approximately one-third. Moreover, the results suggest that in innovative firms, governance mechanisms appear less effective in moderating overconfidence, suggesting that shareholders may tolerate or even encourage overconfident behavior to support risk-intensive innovation strategies.


The article can be accessed through the link.