School of Finance Faculty of Economic Sciences HSE University
119049 Moscow, Russia
11 Pokrovsky Bulvar, S629
School of Finance: df@hse.ru +7 (495) 772-95-90 *27447, *27190, *27947
Master’s Programmes: Corporate Finance, Master of Business Analytics
Doctor of Sciences in Finance, Tenured Professor, Head of the Corporate Finance Center
The HSE School of Finance is the leading Russian competence center in the field of corporate finance, business valuation, banking, stock market, risk management and insurance, accounting and audit.
HSE is the first Russian university in the global ranking "QS - World University Rankings by subject", 2022 in the subject area of Accounting and Finance. Moreover, the university is the 1-st in the rating "THE World University Rankings by subject" in the subject area of Business & Management Studies, 2022
Edited by: A. M. Karminsky, Mikhail Stolbov.
Palgrave Macmillan, 2024.
Svetlana Grigorieva, Narmin Isaeva, Aliya Azizova et al.
Journal of Corporate Finance Research. 2026. Vol. 20. No. 1. P. 75-85.
Dobrynina Polina, Grishunin S.
In bk.: The 12th International Conference on Information Technology and Quantitative Management (ITQM 2025). Netherlands: ScienceDirect, 2025. P. 166-174.
Dobrynskaya V. V., Tomtosov A., Речмедина С.
SERIES: FINANCIAL ECONOMICS. WP BRP 60/FE/2017. НИУ ВШЭ, 2025
The paper examines the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and corporate payout decisions. Building on agency theory and upper echelons theory, the authors show that both external governance enhancements driven by the implementation of Dodd-Frank Act provisions, and internal governance mechanisms, including gender diversity and board independence mitigate the adverse effects of CEO overconfidence on cash dividends, while the moderating effects on share repurchases are less significant. For example, DF provisions attenuate the negative effect of overconfidence on dividend payouts by approximately one-third. Moreover, the results suggest that in innovative firms, governance mechanisms appear less effective in moderating overconfidence, suggesting that shareholders may tolerate or even encourage overconfident behavior to support risk-intensive innovation strategies.