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Regular version of the site
ФКН
Contacts

119049 Moscow, Russia
11 Pokrovskiy boulevard, room S629

Phone:

+7 (495) 772-95-90*27447, *27947, *27190
+7 (495) 916-88-08 (Master’s Programme Corporate Finance)

- Email: df@hse.ru

finance@hse.ru 

Administration
Head of the School Irina Ivashkovskaya

Head of Corporate Finance Research Center, Dr., tenured professor

Manager Uliana Nepryakhina

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27190)

Senior Administrator Olesya Galyanina

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27447)

Administrator Tatyana Lipatova

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27947)

Administrator Irina Skobeleva

+7 495-772-95-90 (add. 27946)

Book
Systemic Financial Risk: An Emerging Market Perspective

Edited by: A. M. Karminsky, Mikhail Stolbov.

Palgrave Macmillan, 2024.

Article
Statistically distinguishable rating scales

Pomazanov M. V.

The Journal of Risk Model Validation. 2026. Vol. 20. No. 1. P. 1-24.

Book chapter
Beyond Claims: CSR Reports, ESG Initiatives, and the Consequences of Impressions Management; Empirical Analysis

Badr I., Rawnaa Ibrahim, Hussainey K.

In bk.: Opportunities and Risks in AI for Business Development. Vol. 2: 546. Bk. Opportunities and Risks in AI for Business Development. Prt. 636. Springer, 2025. P. 385-399.

Working paper
Climate Risk and Bank Liquidity Creation in MENA Region: A Dual Threshold–Quantile Approach

Zaiane S., Semenova M.

SERIES: FINANCIAL ECONOMICS. WP BRP 60/FE/2017. НИУ ВШЭ, 2025

The article by Professor of the School of Finance Irina Ivashkovskaya and Associate Professor of the School of Finance Artem Anilov has been published in Finance Research Letters.

A paper by our colleagues Irina Ivashkovskaya and Artem Anilov titled "On compensation incentives, managerial overconfidence, and payout policy" has been published in the journal Finance Research Letters.

In the article, the authors show that CEO compensation, together with managerial overconfidence, influences corporate payout policy. For example, compensation in the form of company stock reduces dividend payouts in firms with overconfident CEOs, whereas compensation in the form of inside debt increases payouts in such firms. However, these results do not hold for companies in innovative industries or those with weak corporate governance. These findings support theoretical models that predicted a negative impact of high convex compensation for overconfident CEOs on shareholder welfare. 

Read the full text at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S154461232501219X