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Contacts

School of Finance              Faculty of Economic Sciences   HSE University 

119049 Moscow, Russia
11 Pokrovsky Bulvar, S629

School of Finance: df@hse.ru      +7 (495) 772-95-90 *27447, *27190, *27947

Master’s Programmes:  Corporate Finance,           Master of Business Analytics

 

Head of the School of Finance Irina Ivashkovskaya

Doctor of Sciences in Finance, Tenured Professor, Head of the Corporate Finance Center

Manager Uliana Nepryakhina

+7 495-772-95-90 *27190

Senior Administrator Olesya Galyanina

+7 495-772-95-90 *27447

Administrator Tatyana Lipatova

+7 495-772-95-90 *27947

Book
Systemic Financial Risk: An Emerging Market Perspective

Edited by: A. M. Karminsky, Mikhail Stolbov.

Palgrave Macmillan, 2024.

Article
What Drives Green Bonds Returns and Valuation of the Safe-Assets Effecton Global, Russian and Chinese Markets?

Svetlana Grigorieva, Narmin Isaeva, Aliya Azizova et al.

Journal of Corporate Finance Research. 2026. Vol. 20. No. 1. P. 75-85.

Book chapter
The Impact of Sanctions on the Financial Performance and Creditworthiness of Russian Non-Financial Companies

Dobrynina Polina, Grishunin S.

In bk.: The 12th International Conference on Information Technology and Quantitative Management (ITQM 2025). Netherlands: ScienceDirect, 2025. P. 166-174.

Working paper
Momentum Factor or Factor Momentum in REITs Market?

Dobrynskaya V. V., Tomtosov A., Речмедина С.

SERIES: FINANCIAL ECONOMICS. WP BRP 60/FE/2017. НИУ ВШЭ, 2025

The article by Professor of the School of Finance Irina Ivashkovskaya and Associate Professor of the School of Finance Artem Anilov has been published in Finance Research Letters

A paper by our colleagues Irina Ivashkovskaya and Artem Anilov titled "On compensation incentives, managerial overconfidence, and payout policy" has been published in the journal Finance Research Letters.

In the article, the authors show that CEO compensation, together with managerial overconfidence, influences corporate payout policy. For example, compensation in the form of company stock reduces dividend payouts in firms with overconfident CEOs, whereas compensation in the form of inside debt increases payouts in such firms. However, these results do not hold for companies in innovative industries or those with weak corporate governance. These findings support theoretical models that predicted a negative impact of high convex compensation for overconfident CEOs on shareholder welfare. 

Read the full text at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S154461232501219X